Fear Prevails Over Greed: The Kaesong Shutdown

Fear Prevails Over Greed: The Kaesong Shutdown

 

By Alexandre Mansourov

May 21, 2013

 

North Korea's shutdown of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the culmination of a steady deterioration in inter-Korean relations during the political transition from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un in the North and conservative rule in the South.

 

Pyongyang appears to have decided to close the KIC primarily for internal security concerns and for fear of incrementally losing ground to enemy states in a Munich-like fashion, thereby stoking more appetite for land grab and inadvertently inviting the US-ROK aggression.

 

The North Korean regime's March declaration that the inter-Korean relationship had collapsed into a state of war provided the rationale for redefining the KIC as a strategic and military liability that exposes the North to the risk of US-ROK humanitarian intervention, as opposed to a political and diplomatic asset that stabilizes cross-border relations or a source of foreign exchange and advanced technology and know-how.

 

In Pyongyang's deliberations, fear prevailed over greed and chronic internal weakness precipitated external retreat. Pyongyang's repeated references to the ROK government's alleged plans to use Kaesong as a "theatre of confrontation" and "a fuse for provoking a war of aggression against the DPRK" are noteworthy.

 

Three threats in particular appeared to be of the greatest concern to the North Korean regime.

The first was the possible threat that the KIC's closure might spark civil unrest in the wider Kaesong municipality, which could spiral out of control because of almost certain foreign backing and provoke a nationwide civil war like in Syria.

 

The second was the threat that the United States and South Korea might use a crisis over ROK "hostages" in Kaesong as an excuse for a special rescue operation amidst the ongoing Combined Forces Command (CFC) military exercises that could roll over into an all-out invasion of the DPRK overnight.

 

The third was the threat that the ROK government intended to use the KIC as a venue for putting pressure on and strengthening the international sanctions regime against the DPRK.

 

It should not be a surprise that the North Korean authorities have always had misgivings about the KIC--the "large hole in the mosquito net" it created and the potential for "ideological and cultural poisoning" of the residents of Kaesong city and North Hwanghae province. Consequently, they always had a plan to fold it up quickly at a moment's notice.

 

From the Kim regime's perspective, the long-term viability of Kaesong was always in question, with various political, military and economic forces as well as bureaucratic interests constantly battling for the right to determine its future and chip away at the Kaesong economic pie.

 

Kim Jong Il reportedly often told the party cadres not to expect anything from the KIC because its main mission was conceived as being a propaganda tool symbolizing inter-Korean relations in the June 15, 2000, summit, not as a real economic enterprise.

 

The Korean People's Army (KPA) never liked the idea of turning its strategic bridgehead in Kaesong into an extension of the demilitarized zone....Read on.

 

Source: 38north.org

 

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