Has Japan's DPRK Policy Reached a Dead End?

Has Japan's DPRK Policy Reached a Dead End?

 

By Yuki Tatsumi

April 22, 2013

 

On February 12 2013, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test. In response, the United Nation's Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 2094 and imposed additional economic and financial sanctions against Pyongyang.

 

Still, North Korea remains defiant as ever as events of the past few weeks have shown. As the international community grapples for ways to de-escalate the current tension on the Korean peninsula, Japan is reminded yet again how little influence it has on efforts to address security concerns posed by North Korea.

 

When Shinzo Abe earned a second chance to govern Japan as prime minister in December 2012, his return was received with anxiety in Beijing, Seoul and even Washington. Focused on Abe's conservative views and his perspective on Japan's wartime past, pessimists were concerned that the new government might make policy decisions that would aggravate Japan's relations with China and South Korea.

 

Optimists who focused more on Abe's pro-US stance were encouraged that consultation between Washington and Tokyo under the new prime minister would improve. Whether one has a pessimistic or optimistic foreign policy outlook, one thing was clear from the very beginning: Abe's return would likely shift the government's focus back to Japan-DPRK relations.

 

In three years of rule by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), there was little development in that relationship. On every issue, from how Japan would re-vitalize its attempt to carve out a role in the Six Party Talks to addressing bilateral issues with Pyongyang, there were few indications that the DPJ was thinking through its policy.

 

There was also little engagement between Tokyo and Pyongyang, although the Noda government finally began bilateral talks with the North in August 2012. By then, however, it was "too little, too late" to lead to anything meaningful.

 

While none of the DPJ government leaders-Hatoyama, Kan or Noda-were known for their interest in North Korean issues, Shinzo Abe's personal stake is very clear. After all, he became a national political figure because of his commitment to the "abduction issue" as the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for then Prime Minister Koizumi.

 

What is also known is Abe's strong interest in making Japan's defense capability more robust. He has already made clear that he intends to address legal obstacles that restrict the activities of the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF), to increase Japan's defense budget-reversing a trend that has been ongoing for more than a decade-and to stress alliance cooperation with the United States to buttress Japan's security.

 

This does not mean that Abe intends to make Japan into a country with aggressive intentions. It does mean, however, that he intends to send a message that his Japan will not be threatened by anyone, including its neighbors... Read on.

 

Source: 38north.org

 

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