Dealing with a Sore Lip: Parsing China's "Recalculation" of North Korea Policy

Dealing with a Sore Lip: Parsing China's "Recalculation" of North Korea Policy   

 

By Jenny Jun

March 29, 2013

 

Chinese media went wild-as wild as censored media gets-immediately following North Korea's third nuclear test in February 2013. Global Times criticized the event as a failure of China's North Korea policy, while Weibo was flooded with frustrated comments that called for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and even the punishment of North Korea by cutting off Chinese oil and food aid.

 

What was more surprising was the number of Chinese elites and high-level officials who openly voiced dissatisfaction with the nuclear test and the overall state of the Sino-DPRK relationship. The most salient example was Deng Yuwen, deputy editor of the Central Party School's Study Times, urging China to "abandon" North Korea in the Financial Times, which was then immediately translated into Chinese and widely circulated.

 

This rhetoric, coupled with the quick passage of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2087 and 2094, led some to predict a major Chinese policy shift vis-�-vis North Korea; even President Obama commented that China is "recalculating" its policy.

 

Can this all be true though? The answer is yes and no. Yes, we are seeing a fundamental debate on China's North Korea strategy at the highest levels of leadership. Yes, we are seeing a much more active China in nonproliferation efforts-tightening a grip on customs and North Korean banks following 2087 and 2094.

 

While these are noteworthy trends, it is premature to conclude that at the end of this hubbub a drastic policy change will emerge. No, China will not "abandon" North Korea, at least not in response to the recent nuclear test. And no, China will not fundamentally shift its current risk-averse approach.

 

Instead, the key to parsing China's "recalculation" is not to regard the debate as a dichotomy between retaining and abandoning North Korea, but to think of Beijing's policy as having evolved from a one-dimensional policy based on a "friendship sealed in blood" to a multi-dimensional one that seeks diverse strategies-including punishments-to manage different types of risks surrounding the Korean peninsula.

 

Wishful Thinking?

 

The Korean peninsula has always been a geopolitical hotspot. Meiji Japan viewed Korea as "the dagger pointing at the heart of Japan," meaning the seizure of the peninsula by a foreign power could pose security threats to Japan.

 

Chairman Mao referred to the relationship with North Korea as chunwangchihan, an idiom describing how the teeth will be cold after losing the lip covering it. Thus the prevailing logic for much of the 20th century was that North Korea was crucial to the integrity of China's northern border, preventing hostile foreign powers from using the peninsula as a launch pad for invasion.

 

This relationship-even as Pyongyang became increasingly belligerent and as academics pointed out the declining geopolitical utility of the alliance after the Cold War-was often adorned with shows of ideological camaraderie and photos of clinking glasses during state visits.

 

Even after North Korea's second nuclear test in 2009, the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG) led by Hu Jintao decided that it would view the North's nuclear program as separate from the Sino-DRPK relationship.

 

Given the historic nature of Sino-DPRK relations, the discrepancy in rhetoric before and after the third nuclear test and the harsh public comments recently made by CCP and PLA officials have led some to believe a major policy shift is at hand.

 

Parsing these comments, however, reveals two strands of thought: the first involves specific comments about urging the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, while the second suggests the direction of the overall Sino-DPRK relationship.

 

Analysts should not be so quick to translate the first type of comments as insinuations of a policy change, as this could be a mere continuation of the 2009 FALSG guidance that already acknowledges the importance of denuclearization of the peninsula, but distinguishes Chinese efforts on nonproliferation as distinct from Chinese attitudes towards North Korea as an ally. In short, there is a danger in reading too much into statements about denuclearization as signifying a fundamental policy change towards Pyongyang.

 

For example, Mao Xinyu, PLA Major General and the only grandson of Mao Zedong, stated in an RFI article, "North Korea should take the path of denuclearization, peace and development. it is the wish of the Chinese people."

 

The author of that article added that Mao Xinyu had previously held a friendly attitude towards Pyongyang. He also quoted a Beijing diplomat, who thought it was notable that Mao Xinyu, a key individual of the hongerdai (Second Red Generation), took a public stance on North Korea's nuclear problem. The author concluded that these were important indications of Beijing changing its policy towards North Korea.

 

Voice of America Korea, in an article titled, "China, Possibilities in Adjusting North Korea Policy," also listed several comments by senior Chinese officials to corroborate the analysis. Such comments included PLA Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo's statement that China and North Korea's relationship is not a military alliance, and PLA spokesperson Hua Chunying's pronouncement that China will implement UNSCR 2087 and 2094.

 

However, other PLA officials simultaneously agreed on the need for denuclearization as well as an enduring Sino-DPRK alliance...Read on.

 

Source: 38north.org

 

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